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ARE YOU ON THE LIST? DISPELLING THE MYTH OF A TOTAL
EXEMPTION FROM THE PRIVACY ACT’S CIVIL REMEDIES IN
SHEARSON V. DHS
Maxim Brumbach*

No one wants to be on the list.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the post-9/11 era, Americans have increasingly come to accept that
collecting private information is necessary to national security.1
Keeping the public safe undoubtedly requires the government to
maintain lists of persons of interest and assess the threats such
individuals pose to our national security. But what happens when
something goes wrong?
Julia Shearson, a Harvard graduate and a prominent interfaith leader
at the Council on American–Islamic Relations, found out exactly what
can happen.2 On a Sunday evening in January 2006, Ms. Shearson was
returning from a road trip with her four-year-old daughter.3 Their
weekend getaway to Canada was drawing to a close as they crossed the
Peace Bridge approaching Buffalo, New York.4 What happened next
was a traveler’s nightmare. When Ms. Shearson handed her passport
over to a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agent, the agent’s
computer screen flashed red with the message “ARMED AND
DANGEROUS.”5 Ms. Shearson was ordered out of her vehicle,
handcuffed, and detained for questioning.6 Her car was searched, and
she was not allowed to call her family or an attorney.7 After two and a
half hours of questioning, Ms. Shearson was released without
* Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review. This article was drafted
in late 2011 and does not reflect the Supreme Court’s holding in F.A.A. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441
(2012), which is outside the scope of this Casenote.
1. See David Crary, Post-9/11 Tradeoff: Security vs. Civil Lberties, HOUSTON CHRON. (Nov.
22,
2011),
http://www.chron.com/news/article/Post-9-11-tradeoff-Security-vs-civil-liberties2277843.php#page-1.
2. Robert L. Smith, Julia Shearson Tells How a Weekend Trip to Canada Became 5-year Fight
(Jun.
4,
2011),
for
Rights,
CLEVELAND.COM
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/06/julia_shearson_tells_how_a_wee.html. A native of Ohio who
was raised Catholic and converted to Islam, Shearson helped open an office of the Council on
American-Islamic Relations in Cleveland. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Shearson had no criminal record and had never owned a gun. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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explanation.8
After the incident, Ms. Shearson sought answers from the government
but received only a few highly redacted documents in response. She
filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio under the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act seeking
access to her records, a declaration that the CBP report was inaccurate,
and an injunction requiring its correction.9 The district court ruled that
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had exempted its system
of records from the civil remedies provision of the Privacy Act, and Ms.
Shearson’s claims were dismissed.10 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
vacated the dismissal of Shearson’s claims for improper disclosure of
information and for improper monitoring of activity protected by the
First Amendment.11 In reaching this decision, the court held that an
agency may exempt its systems of records from civil liability only to the
extent that the systems of records may be otherwise exempted from
substantive provisions of the Privacy Act.12
Part II of this Casenote examines the validity of this interpretation
related to the history and purpose of the Privacy Act. Part III considers
the competing interpretations in previous cases involving the law
enforcement exemption. Part IV analyzes the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Shearson v. DHS and argues that the statute’s language and underlying
purpose support the court’s narrow interpretation. Part V concludes that
courts should follow the approach in Shearson, but Congress should
pass legislation to protect privacy rights from encroachment by law
enforcement agencies.
II. BACKGROUND
In the early 1970’s, America was faced with a problem: considering
the government’s rapidly growing collection of personal data, how
should citizens be protected from inaccuracies of records and misuse of
personal data?13 This problem grew out of several technological
8. Id.
9. Complaint, Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., (N.D. Ohio Jun. 15, 2006) (No. 106
CV 1478), 2006 WL 2315107 [hereinafter Complaint]. The court also became frustrated with
documents from the agency that were too greatly redacted to read or understand. See Shearson v. U.S.
Dept. of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06 CV 1478, 2008 WL 928487, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 4, 2008) (“The
Court is greatly disturbed at the inordinate amount of redactions present in the government’s brief.
Other than a general overview of the exemptions claimed, there is no other readable material.”).
10. Shearson v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., No. 106 CV 1478, 2007 WL 764026, at *12–13
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2007) rev’d on reconsideration, No. 1:06 CV 1478, 2008 WL 928487 (N.D. Ohio
Apr. 4, 2008).
11. Shearson v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 499 (6th Cir. 2011).
12. Id. at 504.
13. See President Richard Nixon, Radio Address About the American Right of Privacy, February
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advances, including the development of the computer14 and the rise of
consumer credit cards.15 In addition to these developments, the
Watergate scandal sparked fear about secret records the government
kept.16 In this tumultuous political climate, President Nixon called for
immediate action and created the Domestic Council Committee on the
Right of Privacy to develop comprehensive recommendations for new
legislation.17 Congress acted swiftly to draft a law that would protect
individual privacy from government encroachment, ultimately leading to
the passage of the Privacy Act.18
The first subpart of this Part discusses the legislative development of
the Privacy Act (the Act). The next two subparts discuss specifically the
development of the law enforcement exemption and the civil remedies
provision. The final subpart explains the structure of the Act, with an
emphasis on the law enforcement and civil remedies provisions.
A. The Legislative Development of the Privacy Act
When Senator Sam Ervin, Jr. introduced an early version of the
Privacy Act to the Senate, he said, “[T]he appetite of government and
private organizations for information about individuals threatens to
usurp the right to privacy which I have long felt to be among the most
basic of our civil liberties as a free people.”19 Senator Ervin and other
legislators conducted investigations, concluding that many government
agencies maintained huge files of information without specific
guidelines about their maintenance.20 Some of these databases were
23, 1974, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Feb. 23, 1974), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4364
(“Though well-intentioned, Government bureaucracies seem to thrive on collecting additional
information. That information is now stored in over 7,000 Government computers. Collection of new
information will always be necessary. But there must also be reasonable limits on what is collected and
how it is used.”).
14. See id. (“With the advent of the computer in the 1960’s, this data gathering process has
become a big business in the United States—over $20 billion a year—and the names of over 150 million
Americans are now in computer banks scattered across the country.”).
15. See Robin Stein, The Ascendancy of the Credit Card Industry, PBS: FRONTLINE (Nov. 23,
2004), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/more/rise.html.
16. See 120 CONG. REC. S6741 (daily ed. May 1, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in
COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, U.S. SENATE AND COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, U. S. H.R., LEGIS.
HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, S. 3418 (PUBLIC LAW 93-579), SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY at 4
[hereinafter SOURCE BOOK] (“If we have learned anything in this last year of Watergate, it is that there
must be limits upon what the Government can know about each of its citizens.”).
17. Nixon, supra note 13.
18. See 120 CONG. REC. S6741 (daily ed. May 1, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 5–6; Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896-1905
(1974).
19. 120 CONG. REC. S6741 (daily ed. May 1, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 3–4.
20. See Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The First Amendment: A Living Thought in the Computer Age, 4
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“blacklists,” encompassing unverified and outdated information.21 In
many cases, different government agencies freely shared lists and
records.22 According to Senator Ervin, people throughout the country
were “concerned that through a computer error they may be denied basic
fairness and due process of law with respect to benefits and privileges
for which they have applied.”23 Senator Ervin illustrated this problem in
a 1972 article, recounting the story of the mayor of San Francisco who
was accused of involvement with organized crime based on
investigative records that were improperly released to journalists.24
Senator Ervin was not alone in his view; legislators had received
reports that, in light of new data systems being built, failing to set limits
on their operation would seriously jeopardize the security of citizens’
personal information.25 Such systems would be extremely costly to
upgrade or replace after their initial implementation.26 Additionally, the
government’s General Services Administration had proposed a massive
centralized database of personal information called FEDNET.27
Legislators were concerned that the law could not keep up with the fast
pace at which technology was evolving.
In the wake of the Watergate scandal, many politicians were also
nervous about the power that the government could wield through its
Congress was concerned about unauthorized
data collection.28

COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 13, 15–18 (1972). The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights had
untaken a survey of government agencies about their use of databases. Id. at 17. In many cases, the
Subcommittee had trouble getting responses from agencies or received “evasive and misleading”
reports. Id. at 18.
21. Id. at 19. According to Sen. Ervin, these “blacklists” contained “masses of irrelevant,
outdated or even incorrect investigative information based solely on personalities, behavior and beliefs.”
Id.
22. Id. at 21–22.
23. Id at 23. In his article, Sen. Ervin provides numerous examples, including several accounts
of citizens being denied employment based on arrest records disclosed by the F.B.I. Id. at 24–35.
24. Id. at 28.
25. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 7, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 160 (citing
testimony of Dr. Alan F. Westin).
26. Id. (“[T]hese systems may become so large, so expensive, and so vital to so many Americans
that public opinion will be put to a terrible choice—serious interruption of services or installation of
citizen-rights measures.”).
27. Id. at 10–11, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 163–64. Concerned about the
project, the Vice-Presdent said that the government must “consider the fallout hazards of FEDNET to
traditional freedoms.” Id.
28. Id. at 11, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 164 (“The revelations before the
Select Committee to Investigate Presidential Campaign Activities concerning policies and practices of
promoting the illegal gathering, use or disclosure of information on Americans who disagreed with
governmental policies were cited by almost all witnesses as additional reasons for immediate
congressional action on . . . privacy legislation.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 8–9, reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 301–02.
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wiretapping and the existence of secret White House enemy lists.29
President Nixon commented that government knowledge about citizens
“brings with it an awesome potential for harm as well as good—and an
equally awesome responsibility on those who have that knowledge.”30
As the Senate Committee on Government Operations reported, the
Privacy Act was designed to “promote accountability, responsibility,
legislative oversight and open government with respect to the use of
computer technology.”31 Among its several purposes, the Act was
meant to prevent “illegal, unwise, overbroad investigation and record
surveillance of law-abiding citizens.”32 In drafting the initial bill, the
Government Operations Committee relied on several sources, including
a report from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare that
recommended creating a Code of Fair Information Practice based on
five core principles33: (1) there must be no personal data record-keeping
systems whose very existence is secret; (2) there must be a way for
individuals to find out what information about them is in a record and
how it is used; (3) there must be a way for an individual to prevent
information collected for one purpose to be used for another,
incongruent purpose, unless there is consent; (4) there must be a way for
an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable information;
and (5) any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating
records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the
data for its intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of
the data.34
With these concerns in mind, both houses of Congress introduced
bills to protect individual privacy.35 In general, the Senate bill placed
stricter requirements on government agencies than the House bill did.36
The Senate’s bill included a Privacy Protection Commission with broad
oversight responsibilities, while the House version included a study
commission with primarily an advisory role.37 In several ways, the
Senate bill required agencies to maintain records only to the extent
necessary to accomplish their purpose.38 Conversely, the House bill
29. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 8–9, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 301–02.
30. Nixon, supra note 13.
31. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 1, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 154.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 8–9, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 161–62.
34. Id. at 9, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 162.
35. S. 3418, 93rd Cong. § 203 (1974); H.R. 16373, 93rd Cong. (1974).
36. See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 622–23 (2004); Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 799 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
37. 120 CONG. REC. 40405 (1974); reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 860–61
(explaining House version of the bill).
38. See id. at 40406, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 861.
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added limitations on the bill’s reach including the “routine use”
exception that allowed agencies regularly to share certain personal
information, such as payroll data.39 With a tense political climate and
great pressure to take action, legislators worked a compromise between
the two bills in the closing months of 1974.40
B. Development of the Law Enforcement Exemption
While the Privacy Act was arguably rushed through the legislature,
one of the most debated issues was the extent to which national security
and law enforcement agencies should be exempted from the terms of the
law.41 Legislators recognized from the very beginning that national
security and law enforcement efforts could be undermined if the public
was granted access to sensitive agency records.42 Legislators in both
houses of Congress sought to safeguard the work of agencies like the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Justice Department by
creating exemptions, while balancing theses interests against the
individual rights that the Privacy Act would secure.43
The Senate created a narrow exemption in its version of the bill
designed to limit public access to sensitive records.44 The Senate bill
did not create a blanket exemption for law enforcement agencies, but
instead allowed exemptions only for specific systems of records.45
Under a revised version of the bill, law enforcement records were

39. REP. OF THE COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 120 CONG. REC. 40405–06 (Dec. 17, 1974),
reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 859.
40. See 120 CONG. REC. 40410–11 (Dec. 17, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Hruska), reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 871–72.
41. 120 CONG. REC. 36960 (Nov. 21, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Abzug), reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 16, at 938–39.
42. Id. at 36960 (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn), reprinted at SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 939–
40.
43. Compare S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 3, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 156, with
H.R. 16373 § 2(i) reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 252–53.
44. S. 3418, 93rd Cong. § 202 (1974) (as introduced, May 1, 1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 16, at 23. This section provided:
The provisions of this title shall not apply to personal information systems—
(1) to the extent that information in such systems is maintained by a Federal agency, and
the head of that agency determines that the release of the information would seriously
damage national defense;
(2) which are part of active criminal investigatory files compiled by Federal, State, or
local law enforcement organizations, except where such files have been maintained for a
period longer than is necessary to commence criminal prosecution; or
(3) maintained by the press and news media, except information relating to employees of
such organizations.
Id.
45. See id.
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exempted only from provisions for individual access to records, inquiry
into the source of records, and certain limits on the dissemination of
records.46 In some cases, however, an agency head would have to show
that access to a system of records would “seriously damage or impede
the purpose for which the information is maintained.”47 The Senate bill
also included a Privacy Protection Commission with a significant
oversight and investigatory role in these determinations.48
The House of Representatives designed a much broader general
exemption that exempted certain records from nearly all requirements of
the bill.49 The general exemptions applied to all systems of records the
CIA maintained, and most systems maintained “by an agency or
component thereof which perform as its principal function any activity
pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws.”50 The exempted
systems of records would be subject only to the requirement of
publishing a name and description of the system.51
A group of legislators led by Representative Bella Abzug, chair of the
Government Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee, argued
for a more limited law enforcement exemption.52 In Rep. Abzug’s view,
exemptions from the bill were “justified only in the face of
overwhelming societal interests.”53 She emphasized defining the
exemptions “in specific terms related to the use of records rather than to
the agency maintaining them.”54 Accordingly, Rep. Abzug proposed
amendments to eliminate the general exemptions for the CIA and the
Secret Service, arguing that “[a] blanket exemption for any
agency . . . has no place in the bill.”55 Despite Rep. Abzug’s proposals,
the exemptions were left in the bill that was sent to the Senate.56
In light of the disparate versions of the law enforcement exemption,
46. S. 3418, 93rd Cong. § 203 (1974) (as passed by Senate, Nov. 21, 1974), reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 16, at 361–63.
47. See id.
48. Id. § 103, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 338–41. The Commission was to
investigate and report violations of the Act, review new data systems proposed by agencies, and make
recommendations about implementing the Act and developing future legislation. Id.
49. Privacy Act of 1974, H.R. 16373 § 2(i), 93rd Cong. (1974) (as introduced), reprinted in
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 252–53.
50. Id. The Act goes on to specify that the exemption applies only to those systems of records
maintained for law enforcement purposes, including investigation, prosecution, confinement, etc. Id.
51. Id. § 2(e)(1)–(3), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 247–48.
52. 120 CONG. REC. 36960 (remarks of Rep. Abzug), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16,
at 938.
53. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 17 (1974) (additional views of Rep. Abzug), reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 16, at 329.
54. Id., reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 330.
55. 120 CONG. REC. 36960 (remarks of Rep. Abzug), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16,
at 941.
56. See id. at 36960, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 943.
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legislators soon reached a compromise in a further amended version of
the bill that returned to the Senate floor.57 With these revisions in place,
Senator Roman Hruska argued that the compromise did not effectively
address the issue of national security and law enforcement records.58
Senator Hruska, fearing that further change would drag out the process,
proposed to deal with such records through separate legislation.59 Under
pressure to act before the end of the legislative session, however, the
Senate and the House both approved the compromise version virtually
unaltered.60 The compromise version, substantively the same as the Act
stands today, kept the House’s broad general exemption framework but
added numerous sections to the list of non-exemptible provisions.61
C. Development of the Civil Remedies Provision
Embracing many of the same policy concerns as the law enforcement
exemption, the civil remedies provision similarly required a major
compromise between the two versions of the bill.62 The Senate version
provided for strong civil enforcement, originally allowing plaintiffs to
recover actual and punitive damages.63 The House bill, on the other
hand, sought to limit the scope of government liability.64 While the
Senate version required the plaintiff to prove only negligence, the House
version required proof that a violation was “willful, capricious, and
arbitrary.”65 Ultimately, legislators compromised on a standard of
“willful or intentional” conduct, but added a statutory minimum of
$1,000 in damages.66
Significantly, the Supreme Court has construed the damages
provision narrowly to limit recovery to actual damages proven by the
plaintiff.67 Thus, while Congress arguably intended to create a type of
57. See id.
58. 120 CONG. REC. 36905–07 (remarks of Sen. Hruska), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note
16, at 809–11.
59. Id.
60. 120 CONG. REC. 40885–86, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 998–1001. The
principle difference involved the Senate’s Privacy Commission. To reach a compromise with the
House, the amended bill included a study commission with a much lesser role than originally
contemplated by the Senate. See id.
61. Compare Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896-1905 (1974), with 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a (2006).
62. See Haeji Hong, Dismantling the Private Enforcement of the Privacy Act of 1974: Doe v.
Chao, 38 AKRON L. REV. 71, 86–87 (2005).
63. Id. at 87.
64. Id. at 88.
65. Id.
66. See Hong, supra note 62, at 89–90.
67. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 627 (2004).
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presumed damages, the provision has not been interpreted to do so.68
The policies that underlie the debate on government liability are too vast
to discuss here, but it is sufficient to say the narrow construction of the
Privacy Act’s civil remedies significantly limits the power of private
enforcement.69
D. The Structure of the Privacy Act
In general, the Privacy Act lists numerous duties imposed on
government agencies that limit the way they can collect, store, and
The subsections place specific
transmit private information.70
requirements upon the way an agency maintains its records.71 Most of
these requirements, however, do not apply to law enforcement databases
due to the law enforcement and routine use exemptions.72
When the Act was drafted, Congress understood the need for certain
government databases to be exempt from provisions of the Act because
some databases involve sensitive law enforcement and national security
information.73 Subsection (j) of the Act provides a general exemption
for databases the CIA maintains, and provides exemptions for other
agencies that principally perform activities “pertaining to the
enforcement of criminal laws.”74 If an agency promulgates appropriate
regulations including the reason for the exemption, then a system of
records may be exempted from most of the Act’s provisions.75
However, subsection (j) lists specific sections from which a law
enforcement system of records may not be exempted.76 These nonexemptible sections form a core of requirements that apply to all
government databases. Under these requirements, an agency must:

68. Id.; see also Hong, supra note 62, at 100–01.
69. Hong, supra note 62, at 102–03; see also Alex Kardon, Damages Under the Privacy Act:
Sovereign Immunity and a Call for Legislative Reform, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 705, 758–59
(2011).
70. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 552a(j)–(k); see also infra note 74.
73. See S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 74–75, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 227–28;
H.R. REP NO. 93-1416, at 3–4, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 296–97.
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (2006). This subsection provides, “The head of any agency may
promulgate rules . . . to exempt any system of records within the agency from any part of this section
except subsections (b), (c)(1) and (2), (e)(4)(A) through (F), (e)(6), (7), (9), (10), and (11), and (i) if the
system of records is—(1) maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency; or (2) maintained by an
agency or component thereof which performs as its principal function any activity pertaining to the
enforcement of criminal laws, including [information concerning any stage of investigation, arrest,
charging, disposition, sentencing or parole].” Id.
75. Id.; see also Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 595 F.2d 954, 957 (4th Cir. 1979).
76. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j).
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(1) disclose a record only as specifically provided by subsection (b) of the
statute−such disclosure is generally limited by the reason for the
disclosure, i.e., law enforcement records may be disclosed for other law
enforcement purposes;77
(2) account for disclosure and keep the accounting on file for five years;
(3) publish a description of each system of records in the federal register;
(4) make reasonable efforts to assure that disseminated records are
“accurate, complete, timely, and relevant” to the agency’s purpose;
(5) maintain no record of First Amendment activity except as authorized,
including when pertinent to and within the scope of law enforcement;
(6) establish rules and security safeguards to protect confidentiality; and
(7) publish any new use of data 30 days in advance of such use.78

An agency also cannot exempt itself from the criminal penalties
provision of the Act.79
To enforce the duties described in the Act, the civil remedies
provision covers four specific situations listed under subsection (g).
These situations include when an agency (1) determines not to amend
records, (2) refuses access to records, (3) fails to maintain accurate
records, and (4) fails to adhere to other provisions of the Act and causes
an adverse effect (the “catch-all” provision).80 The first two remedy
provisions apply to parts of the Act that are within the scope of the law
enforcement exemption.81 The remaining accuracy and catch-all
remedies have been the subject of some debate among litigants since
these remedies may be used to enforce rights guaranteed by the nonexemptible parts of the Act.82 Because these subsections are not
mentioned among the non-exemptible sections listed under the law
enforcement exemption, courts have struggled to determine whether the
exemption provision allows an agency to escape liability related to the
accuracy and catch-all provisions.83

77. Id. § 552a(b). The section permits, in pertinent part, disclosure (1) “to those officers and
employees of the agency which maintains the record who have a need for the record in the performance
of their duties”; (2) “for a routine use as defined in subsection (a)(7)”; (3) “to another agency or to an
instrumentality of any governmental jurisdiction within or under the control of the United States for a
civil or criminal law enforcement activity if the activity is authorized by law, and if the head of the
agency or instrumentality has made a written request”; and (4) under certain other circumstances
required by law. Id.
78. See id. § 552a(j), (b), (c)(1)–(2), (e)(4)(A)–(F), (e)(6)–(7), (e)(9)–(10), and (e)(11).
79. Id.; id. § 552a(i). This section provides for a fine of up to $5,000 for (1) willfully,
improperly disclosing information; (2) willfully maintaining a system of records without notice; or (3)
willfully requesting or obtaining a record under false pretenses. Id.
80. Id. § 552a(g); see also Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 502 (6th Cir.
2011) (quoting Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 618–19 (2004)).
81. See Shearson, 638 F.3d at 502; Doe v. F.B.I., 936 F.2d 1346, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
82. E.g., Shearson, 638 F.3d at 502–03.
83. See id.
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III. CASE LAW ON THE LAW ENFORCEMENT EXEMPTION
Two interpretations of the Privacy Act’s law enforcement exemption
have emerged. Under the first interpretation, some courts have held that
an agency may exempt a system of records from civil remedies
entirely.84 Under the second interpretation, other courts have concluded
that an agency may exempt a system of records from civil remedies only
to the extent that the Act’s other substantive provisions are exemptible.85
A. The “Complete Exemption” Interpretation
One of the first cases to test the Privacy Act’s law enforcement
exemptions was Ryan v. Department of Justice.86 In Ryan, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that, but for a procedural failure, the Justice
Department could have exempted its system of records from subsection
(g) completely.87 The plaintiff, an FBI security officer, alleged that the
Justice Department had wrongfully disclosed information to the
Washington Post about his work.88 He sought access to a memorandum
concerning him, as well as damages for the alleged wrongful
disclosure.89 The court held that the FBI had appropriately exempted
the system containing the memo from the Act’s mandatory access
provision in subsection (d).90 The court explained that the Privacy Act
requires an agency to promulgate rules stating both the exemption and
the reason for such exemption.91 Examining the Justice Department’s
regulations, the court concluded that the agency had provided a rationale
pertaining only to subsection (d) of the Act.92 The agency had,
therefore, exempted its records only from that specific subsection.93
Nonetheless, the court stated that the agency “had the authority to
exempt [the system of records] from the application of all the civil
remedies.”94
In 1986, a pair of appellate cases endorsed the same reasoning as
Ryan.95 In Kimberlin v. U.S. Department of Justice, the Seventh Circuit
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id.
See id.
Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 595 F.2d 954, 954 (4th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 958.
Id. at 955.
Id.
Id. at 957–58.
Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 595 F.2d 954, 957 (4th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 958.
Id.
Id.
See Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1986); Alexander v. United
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considered an inmate’s wrongful disclosure claim and ultimately found
that the disclosure was proper under a separate routine use exception in
subsection (b).96 In a footnote, however, the court echoed the Fourth’s
Circuit’s view that systems of records can be exempted from subsection
(g).97 As in Ryan, the statement was not necessary to the court’s
dismissing the plaintiff’s claims.98
Soon after the Kimberlin decision, the Ninth Circuit finally applied
the complete exemption interpretation to bar a plaintiff’s Privacy Act
claim.99 In Alexander v. United States, the plaintiff alleged that he had
been terminated from his job as a security officer because the FBI failed
to maintain accurate records on his rap sheet.100 According to the
plaintiff, his record contained information about two arrests that a court
had ordered expunged.101 Upon considering the plaintiff’s Privacy Act
claims, the court held that the FBI had properly promulgated regulations
to exempt its Identification Division Records System from the civil
The exemption from the provision was
remedies provision.102
necessary, according to the FBI’s regulations, because subsection (g)
“concern[s] an individual’s access to records” and “the vast majority of
records in this system concern local arrests which it would be
inappropriate for the FBI to undertake to correct.”103 Further, the court
stated that the law enforcement exemption “expressly prohibits suits
against an agency for passing inaccurate information to a third party, if
appropriate regulations have been issued.”104 The court provided no
additional analysis of the statute’s language or purpose in reaching this
conclusion.105
Though the notion of a complete exemption from subsection (g) was
explicitly held only in Alexander, other district court cases have
confirmed the acceptance of this construction.106 In Aquino v. Stone, the
plaintiff claimed that the Army wrongfully failed to amend a record
stating that the plaintiff had been investigated for sexual abuse of a

States, 787 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1986).
96. Kimberlin, 788 F.2d at 435–38.
97. Id. at 436 n.2.
98. Compare Kimberlin, 788 F.2d at 436, with Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 595 F.2d 954, 958 (4th
Cir. 1979).
99. Alexander, 787 F.2d at 1351–52.
100. Id. at 1350.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1351.
103. Id. at 1351 n.2.
104. Alexander v. United States, 787 F.2d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir. 1986).
105. See id. at 1351–52.
106. See, e.g., Aquino v. Stone, 768 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff’d, 957 F.2d 139 (4th Cir.
1992).
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child.107 The court cited Ryan for the proposition that an agency may
exempt law enforcement records from subsection (g) and never
Similarly, in
considered the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.108
Witherspoon v. F.B.I., the District Court for the District of Columbia
succinctly held that the plaintiff did not state a cause of action for the
F.B.I.’s alleged failure to maintain accurate records of his “rap sheet.”109
As recently as March 2010, the District Court for the Northern District
of Florida again confirmed the “total exemption” interpretation in Study
v. United States.110 In Study, the court dismissed the pro se plaintiff’s
wrongful dissemination claim against county officials and the F.B.I.111
B. The “Limited Exemption” Interpretation
Though the Ryan interpretation seemed to dominate the circuit courts,
the D.C. Circuit reached a significantly narrower interpretation of the
law enforcement exemption.112 In Tijerina v. Walters, the D.C. Circuit
broke from the earlier line of cases, holding that the government could
not use subsection (j) to exempt itself entirely from subsection (g).113 In
Tijerina, the plaintiff alleged that the Veterans Administration (VA)
failed to maintain records accurately and improperly disclosed the
results of a home mortgage audit.114 The VA had conducted a random
audit of Tijerina’s loan transaction and concluded Tijerina had lied on
his verification of employment form.115 Though the agency declined to
prosecute Tijerina, one of the agency’s inspectors learned that Tijerina
had taken the District of Columbia bar exam and planned to take the
Texas bar exam as well.116 The inspector sent unsolicited letters to the
bar admissions authorities in both jurisdictions, informing them that
Tijerina had falsified a document during his mortgage application

107. Id. at 529–30.
108. Id. at 530.
109. Witherspoon v. F.B.I., No. CIV.A. 96-619 GK, 1997 WL 135718, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 17,
1997). This is a most perplexing result, since the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had previously
rejected such a construction in Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also
discussion infra Part III.B.
110. Study v. United States, No. 3:08-CV-493/MCR/EMT, 2010 WL 1257655, at *4 (N.D. Fla.
Mar. 4, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:08-CV-493/MCR/EMT, 2010 WL 1257654
(N.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2010).
111. Id. at *1–4. Admittedly, this claim was poorly made at best. State and local officials are not
subject to the Privacy Act.
112. Tijerina, 821 F.2d at 797.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 791–93.
115. Id. at 792.
116. Id.
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process.117
The court engaged in a lengthy analysis of subsections (g) and (j),
ultimately rejecting the government’s complete exemption
interpretation.118 The court initially observed that subsection (j) permits
an agency to exempt a system of records from provisions of the Act—
not the agency itself.119 The exemption, the court reasoned, applies only
to substantive requirements of the Act that would interfere with the
secrecy of law enforcement activities.120 The court also cited a House
Report that said law enforcement records would still be subject to the
disclosure requirements.121 The court expressly declined to follow the
reasoning of Ryan and Kimberlin, finding that the issue had not been
squarely presented in those cases and such a construction would “make[]
the Act a foolishness.”122 The D.C. Circuit later clarified Tijerina’s
holding in Doe v. FBI, declaring, “[A]n agency cannot escape liability
for non-exemptible Privacy Act obligations simply by exempting itself
from the Act’s remedial provisions.”123
C. The District Court’s Opinion in Shearson v. DHS
In Shearson v. DHS, the District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio accepted the complete exemption interpretation and dismissed the
plaintiff’s Privacy Act claims against DHS.124 In her complaint,
Shearson alleged that DHS had improperly refused her access to records
and had improperly disseminated her records.125 She claimed that DHS
had “failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure the accuracy of the
records, improperly maintained records pertaining to her First
Amendment activity, and failed to properly account for certain
disclosures.”126
Upon consideration of these claims, the district court concluded that,
regardless of the merits of her allegations, Shearson had “no private

117. Tijerina v. Walters. 821 F.2d 789, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This ultimately led to the Texas bar
authority finding Mr. Tijerina “morally unfit to take the Texas bar examination.” Id. at 791.
118. Id. at 795.
119. Id. at 795–96.
120. Id. at 796.
121. Id.
122. Tijerina v. Walters. 821 F.2d 789, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
123. Doe v. F.B.I., 936 F.2d 1346, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The plaintiff in Doe v. F.B.I. attempted
to strain the holding of Tijerina to render the agency liable under an exemptible part of the Act. See id.
124. Shearson v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 106 CV 1478, 2007 WL 764026 at *12–13 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 9, 2007), rev’d on reconsideration, 1:06 CV 1478, 2008 WL 928487 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 4,
2008).
125. Complaint, supra note 9, at ¶¶ 44, 50.
126. Shearson, 2007 WL 764026 at *12 n.14.
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right of action” to pursue them under the Privacy Act.127 The court
examined the reasoning of Tijerina closely, but ultimately rejected it for
two reasons.128 First, the court found that the plain language of
subsection (j) permits an agency to exempt a system of records from any
provision other than those specifically listed.129 Second, the court
compared the civil remedies provision with the criminal enforcement
provision (subsection (i)) and determined that the inclusion of the latter
on the non-exemptible list meant that Congress had deliberately
excluded the civil remedies provision.130
D. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision,
concluding the limited exemption interpretation reached by the D.C.
Circuit was the better approach.131 The Sixth Circuit began its analysis
with the plain language of the statute, but found that the language
pointed in two different directions: subsection (j) omits subsection (g)
from the list of non-exemptible provisions, but subsection (j)
simultaneously precludes an agency from exempting a system of records
from other provisions which would be vindicated through subsection
(g)’s remedies.132 Against this backdrop, the court considered the case
law for both interpretations.133 The court revisited the lower court’s
comparison of the civil remedies provision and the criminal penalties
provision, but ultimately found such a comparison unhelpful.134 The
criminal penalties section makes certain conduct a crime while the civil
remedies provision is “strictly an enforcement section” that relies on the
rest of the Act’s substantive obligations.135 Thus, the court reasoned, the
two sections are not parallel.136
Moreover, the court observed that including subsection (g) on the list
of non-exemptible subsections “might have caused confusion with
respect to exemptible obligations.”137 If, as the court in Tijerina
reasoned, subsection (g) provides remedies to both exemptible and nonexemptible provisions then it would be confusing to include the whole
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at *12, *12 n.14.
Id. at *12.
Id.
Id.
Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 502.
Id. at 502–03.
Id. at 503. The court noted that this problem gave them pause, however. See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of subsection (g) on the list.138 The court also noted that subsection (j)’s
non-exemptible provisions list omits a part of the Act that enables
guardians to act on the behalf of minors, another provision devoid of
substantive obligations which Congress probably did not intend to make
exemptible.139
Additionally, the court scrutinized DHS’s regulations and determined
it was unclear whether they sufficiently exempted the system of records
from subsection (g) in the first place.140 According to regulations, the
system of records was “exempted from [subsection (g)] to the extent that
the civil remedies may relate to provisions of [the Privacy Act] from
which these rules exempt the systems of records, since there should be
no civil remedies for failure to comply with provisions from which the
Department is exempted.”141 With the scope of this exemption
somewhat unclear, the court found the regulation to be ambiguous.142
Since it had concluded that DHS’s system of records was not exempt
from the civil remedies provision, the court vacated the dismissal of
Shearson’s Privacy Act claims and remanded the case for proceedings in
the district court.143
IV. DISCUSSION
The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the law enforcement exemption
closes a loophole for government agencies that departs from the original
intent of the Privacy Act.144 The court wisely considered the operation
of other provisions to determine the proper function of the law
enforcement exemption, rejecting earlier analyses that failed to do so.145
The court’s decision supports private enforcement that the legislature
intended as a key component of the Privacy Act.146 Though the vitality
of the private enforcement scheme is in doubt, the court’s holding in
Shearson preserves the core principle that government agencies must
answer for failures to maintain records in the manner Congress
138. See id.
139. Id. at 503–04.
140. Id. at 504. The regulations further justified the exemption as “protect[ing] the Department
from baseless civil court actions that might hamper its ability to collate, analyze, and disseminate
investigative, intelligence, and law enforcement data.” Id. Presumably, however, not all civil lawsuits
will be baseless. To the extent that they may hamper the collection and dissemination of intelligence
information, meritorious private lawsuits are the means Congress chose to enforce the Privacy Act. See
Hong, supra note 62, at 103–05.
141. Id. (quoting 31 C.F.R. § 1.36(d)(12)).
142. Id. at 504–05.
143. Id. at 506.
144. See supra notes 44, 53.
145. Shearson, 638 F.3d at 503–04.
146. See Hong, supra note 62, at 103.
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prescribed.147
A. Textual Interpretation
Upon meaningful consideration, a construction of subsection (g) that
prevents complete exemption follows well-established principles of
textual interpretation. It is axiomatic that the starting point of any
statutory interpretation must be the plain language.148 Acknowledging
this principle, the Sixth Circuit observed that subsection (g) is
“conspicuously absent” from the list of non-exemptible provisions of the
Act.149 To other courts, this has ended the inquiry—subsection (g) is not
on the list, so it must be exemptible.150 However, an appropriate
analysis of subsection (g) must consider its role in the context of the
whole statute. Construing only one part of a complex statute could
easily lead to illogical results, and such a construction should be
avoided.151 The court observed that subsection (g) is “strictly an
enforcement section” that must be interpreted according to its
interaction with the substantive duties set forth in the statute.152
Congress did not include subsection (g) on the list of non-exemptible
sections because it does not belong there. Rather, it is meant to enforce
numerous substantive duties, some of them mandatory and others
subject to the law enforcement exemption.153
The Sixth Circuit declined to mention the simplest and strongest
rejection of the government’s interpretation: the difference between an
agency and a system of records.154 As the D.C. Circuit observed in
Tijerina, subsection (j) permits an agency to exempt a system of records
from most of the Act’s requirements, not the agency itself.155
Subsection (g) provides a civil remedy when an agency fails to comply
with certain parts of the Act.156 This remedy is used to enforce
substantive obligations placed upon the agency elsewhere in the Act.
Thus, an agency may exempt law enforcement records from subsection
147. See S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 16, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 169.
148. Shearson, 638 F.3d at 500.
149. Id. at 502.
150. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 787 F.2d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir. 1986).
151. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (“[I]n rare cases the literal
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters, and
those intentions must be controlling.”).
152. Shearson, 638 F.3d at 503.
153. Id.
154. Compare Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 795–96 (D.C. Cir. 1987), with Shearson, 638
F.3d at 503–04.
155. Tijerina, 821 F.2d at 795–96; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (2006).
156. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (“Whenever any agency . . . fails to comply with any other provision of
this section . . . .”); see Tijerina, 821 F.2d at 795–96.
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(d)’s provision for individual access rather than attempting to exempt
the agency itself from subsection (g)(1)(B)’s enforcement mechanism.157
This difference reflects Congress’s intention that exemptions should be
determined by the nature of the database—presumably, a law
enforcement agency may maintain systems of records about
employment, financial data, or other non-sensitive subjects that are
properly regulated by the Privacy Act.158 Using the exemption
procedures cannot provide a basis for an agency to escape all liability
under the Privacy Act when the law enforcement exemption protects
only certain systems of records.159 The court should have included this
significant textual argument in support of its interpretation.
On the other hand, the court provided two additional arguments based
on analogies to other parts of the statute.160 First, the court rejected the
government’s argument by analogy that Congress’s inclusion of the
criminal penalties provision in subsection (j) indicates Congress meant
to make subsection (g) exemptible.161 This argument invokes a
traditional canon of statutory construction,162 suggesting that the
inclusion of the criminal penalties provision is instructive to Congress’
intent to exclude others. However, as the court wisely observed,
Congress needed to include the criminal penalties provision because
“there is no other place in [the Act] where conduct is made criminal and
subject to penalty.”163 Since subsection (g) enforces the duties that other
sections of the Act impose, it would be confusing to place subsection (g)
among the non-exemptible provisions.164 Doing so would circularly
create a non-exemptible cause of action against the violation of
exemptible duties.165
Second, the court made another analogy between the omission of
subsection (g) and the omission of subsection (h).166 Subsection (h)

157. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d), (g)(1)(B); see also Doe v. F.B.I., 936 F.2d at 1351–52.
158. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 18–19 (1974), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at
311–12.
159. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (“The head of any agency may promulgate rules . . . to exempt any system
of records within the agency . . . .”) (emphasis added).
160. Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 503–04 (6th Cir. 2011).
161. Id.
162. The canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius holds “that to express or include one thing
implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see
also Shearson, 638 F.3d at 503.
163. Shearson, 638 F.3d at 503.
164. See id.
165. See id. Consider subsection (g)(1)(B), which refers explicitly to an exemptible provision:
“Whenever any agency refuses to comply with an individual request under subsection(d)(1) of this
section . . . the individual may bring a civil action against the agency . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(B)
(2006).
166. Shearson, 638 F.3d at 503–04.
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provides “that a guardian may act on behalf of a minor or incapacitated
person” in pursuing a Privacy Act claim.167 It seems unlikely that
Congress meant for agencies to exempt their databases from being
accessed by legal guardians.168
B. Lack of Analysis in Early Cases Interpreting Subsection (g)
The Sixth Circuit appropriately rejected early cases dealing with the
law enforcement exemption, since these cases reached a poor conclusion
about the meaning of subsection (g) by extending Ryan’s initial
interpretation without meaningful analysis.169 To begin with, the Fourth
Circuit in Ryan mentioned the possibility of total exemption only in
dicta.170 The court ultimately found that the government had not
followed the procedure to exempt its system of records, making its
interpretation of the breadth of such an exemption irrelevant to the
holding.171 In Alexander, the Ninth Circuit went further afield by
holding that the exemption “expressly prohibits suits against an agency”
based on third party disclosure. This was certainly a stretch, considering
the Act makes no mention of “prohibiting suits,” and the “conditions of
disclosure” section of the Act is non-exemptible under subsection (j).172
Indeed, it is clear from the legislative history that Congress reached a
compromise that avoided this type of “blanket exemption.”173 Courts,
nonetheless, seem to have accepted this analysis over the years.
To what may continued reliance on these cases be attributed?
Perhaps this trend has emerged because plaintiffs have failed to present,
effectively, the argument that Tijerina and Shearson support. Several of
the law enforcement exemption cases involve inmates who filed
complaints pro se and seemed to find little sympathy with the courts.174
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 787 F.2d 1349, 1351–52 (9th Cir. 1986).
170. Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 595 F.2d 954, 958 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he Justice Department could
have exempted [its system of records] from the application of the 552a(g) civil remedies
provisions . . . .”); see also Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing Ryan,
595 F.2d 954).
171. Ryan, 595 F.2d at 958.
172. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (2006); see also statutory text supra note 74.
173. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 74, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 227; H.R. REP. NO.
93-1416, at 18–19, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 311–12.
174. See, e.g., Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434, 435–36 (7th Cir. 1986)
(involving a plaintiff who sued for Privacy Act claims, Bivens claims for due process, and a conspiracy
claim); Study v. United States, No. 3:08-CV-493/MCR/EMT, 2010 WL 1257655, at *2–3 (N.D. Fla.
Mar. 4, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:08-CV-493/MCR/EMT, 2010 WL 1257654
(N.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2010) (involving a case in which the plaintiff named more than seventeen
defendants and brought several claims including wrongful dissemination, reputational harm, and “pain
and humiliation”).
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Courts in some cases struggled to articulate the causes of action that
these plaintiffs presented, sorting meritorious claims out of a heap of
allegations against the government.175 It is easy to imagine that such a
claim would not guide the court through the nuances of statutory
construction.
Conversely, the plaintiff in Tijerina, though also a pro se litigant, was
a law student who made very specific and credible allegations of
improper disclosure.176 This type of improper disclosure is one of the
quintessential harms that the Privacy Act was aimed at preventing.177
Indeed, many of the non-exemptible provisions specifically relate to the
restrictions on disclosure.178 Whatever the reason for this inadequacy,
courts have spoken of the law enforcement exemption in absolute terms
only when they also declined to consider the results of such a
construction.179
C. Agencies’ Recognition of Limits on the Exemption
Agencies themselves support the limited exemption interpretation, as
evident from regulations promulgated by DHS and others.180 While the
Shearson court acknowledged that DHS’s regulations were
“ambiguous,” the court could have simply interpreted the regulations to
mean that the system was only partially exempt.181 The regulations
stated that the TECS database “should be exempt from [subsection (g)]
to the extent that the civil remedies may relate to provisions of [the
statute] from which these rules exempt the system of records.”182
Though the court found the rule to be unclear, a better reading seems to
be that these regulations explicitly limit the exemption to the otherwise
exemptible parts of the statute. Indeed, why would such language be
included if it were the agencies intention to exempt a system of records
from all civil liability?
Unfortunately, courts have similarly failed to hold an agency
accountable for its own recognition of limits to the exemption in other
cases. In Ryan, the court acknowledged that the FBI had justified its
175. See cases cited supra note 174.
176. Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 791–93 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
177. See S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 1, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 154.
178. See Tijerina, 821 F.2d at 796.
179. E.g., Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434, 438 n.2 (7th Cir. 1986); Ryan v.
Dep’t of Justice, 595 F.2d 954, 957–58 (4th Cir. 1979).
180. See, e.g., Tijerina, 821 F.2d at 796. Examining the Veterans Administration’s regulations,
the court concluded, “None of the purposes the VA cited is remotely served by allowing the agency to
escape civil liability for violations of the disclosure or accuracy requirements of the Act.” Id.
181. See Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 504–05 (6th Cir. 2011).
182. See id. at 504 (quoting 31 C.F.R. § 1.36(d)(12)).
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law enforcement exemption with respect to only one provision of the
Act (the access provision).183 Rather than drawing an inference that the
agency recognized limits to its own exemption authority, the court
instead stated that the FBI could “completely exempt” its system of
records.184 Similarly in Alexander, the Ninth Circuit offered no analysis
of the regulations exempting another FBI database.185 Those regulations
exempted the database because subsection (g) “concern[ed] an
individual’s right to access records which concern him [and correct
inaccuracies].”186 While this rationale plainly does not cover all parts of
subsection (g), the court nonetheless considered this sufficient to bar all
civil claims under the Act.187 Interpreting the agency regulations so
broadly swept away many of the duties deliberately that Congress
imposed on agencies188
Admittedly, the Sixth Circuit did not have to rely on an interpretation
of DHS’s regulation to reach its holding.189 Still, courts need not give
agencies the benefit of the doubt concerning their own regulations.
Since two viable interpretations of the law enforcement exemption exist,
agencies should be on notice that their regulations will be scrutinized.
This is particularly true, since there is essentially no incentive for
agencies to police themselves.190
D. The Need for Private Enforcement
The Shearson court, like numerous others, largely avoided a
discussion of the policies underlying the Privacy Act by reaching a
conclusive holding based on the language of the Act.191 While this
shows a measure of judicial restraint, it does not address the weighty
policies underlying Congress’s enactment of the Privacy Act or the
scheme of enforcement Congress designed.
While the legislative history of the Act is somewhat limited, debate
and compromise over the extent of the law enforcement exemption

183. Ryan, 595 F.2d at 958.
184. Ryan, 595 F.2d at 957–58. The regulations read: “This subsection is inapplicable to the
extent that the system is exempt from other specific sub-sections of the Privacy Act.” Id. (emphasis
added).
185. Alexander v. United States, 787 F.2d 1349, 1351–52 (9th Cir. 1986).
186. Id. at 1351 n.2.
187. Id. at 1351–52.
188. See discussion supra Part II(A).
189. Shearson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding that the
terms of Act itself permitted no such exemption).
190. See Hong, supra note 62, at 105.
191. Shearson, 638 F.3d at 503–04.
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shows the balance that Congress sought to strike.192 The Senate wanted
to pass a bill that placed strict limits on agencies and gave strong
enforcement powers to citizens and to an independent commission.193
On the other hand, the House bill nearly cut law enforcement and
national security agencies out of the bill entirely.194 Exemptions in the
House bill would have placed vast areas of government data collection
out of the reach of individuals.195 In light of differences between the
bills, it is reasonable to conclude that subsection (j) contains a list of
substantive duties that both Houses of Congress agreed to impose upon
law enforcement agencies.196
Moreover, the legislative history shows that Congress intended many
of the included provisions to be vindicated through private
enforcement.197 The Act provides a right to access and amend records
that Congress designed with a private enforcement scheme in mind.198
It follows that violations of the duty to maintain accurate and complete
records would be enforced similarly. Individuals have the strongest
interest to protect their own rights, and compromise on the extent of the
privacy rights secured by the Act shows that Congress never agreed to
place agencies beyond the reach of private enforcement.199
When considering the effectiveness of private enforcement, it is
significant that the Supreme Court has placed strict limits on recovery
under the Privacy Act.200 In Doe v. Chao, the court narrowed
entitlement to the statutory minimum of $1,000 by requiring the plaintiff
to prove actual damages.201 The Act itself imposes an initial limit on
damages, which a plaintiff may recover only as the result of a
government official’s “intentional or willful” conduct.202 The court
found that the legislative history did not support “presumed damages”

192. Compare S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 3, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 156, with
H.R. 16373 § 2(i) reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 252–53.
193. See S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 3, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 156.
194. H.R. 16373 § 2(i), 93rd Cong. (1974) (as introduced), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra
note 16, at 252–53.
195. See id.
196. See Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
197. H.R. REP. 93-1416, at 4, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 297; S. REP. NO. 931183, at 82–83, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 235–36. The Senate report noted that
enforcement by private citizens was “doubly important,” since the revised bill no longer included
enforcement through a Privacy Commission. Id.
198. See H.R. REP. 93-1416, at 4, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 297; S. REP. NO.
93-1183, at 82–83, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 235–36.
199. See Hong, supra note 62, at 103–06.
200. See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 627 (2004); Kardon, supra note 69, at 758–59.
201. Chao, 540 U.S at 627.
202. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2006); see Chao, 540 U.S at 620.
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for any such intentional or willful violations of the Act.203 By requiring
plaintiffs to prove actual damages, the court further raised what was
already a high barrier to private enforcement of the Act.204
The high court may be poised to raise the barrier yet again, as it
considers the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in FAA v. Cooper.205 In
Cooper, the Ninth circuit construed the recovery of damages under the
Act to include pecuniary and non-pecuniary harms.206 Other courts have
reached the opposite conclusion, finding that damages may be awarded
only for pecuniary harms.207 As the Supreme Court has taken up the
question, it may further limit recovery in a way that utterly disables the
effectiveness of private enforcement.208
E. Other Means of Vindicating Privacy Rights
With the effectiveness of the Privacy Act’s civil remedies in serious
doubt, it is useful to consider other ways a plaintiff might seek to
vindicate privacy rights. In Shearson, the plaintiff sought, essentially,
declaratory and injunctive relief only.209 Her objective was to learn the
contents of the government databases that led to a “false report” and
compel the government to amend them for accuracy and adherence to
the terms of the Privacy Act.210 However, there are numerous other
situations where the plaintiff seeks monetary redress as well.211
One possibility might lie in state tort law, pursuant to which a
plaintiff could seek redress for harms caused by improper record
keeping.212 However, holding the government liable on pure tort
theories, such as defamation, is difficult to accomplish.213 Often in such
cases, “the primary damage . . . is mental distress,”214 which may be
difficult to prove. Another possibility might be a Constitutional claim—
the drafters of the Privacy Act based their grant of statutory rights on
those found in the Constitution.215 As Senator Ervin noted, the Supreme
203. Chao, 540 U.S at 622–23.
204. See Kardon, supra note 69, at 759; see also Hong, supra note 62, at 102–03.
205. F.A.A. v. Cooper, 622 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3025 (2011); see
also Kardon, supra note 69, at 766.
206. Cooper, 622 F.3d at 1035.
207. E.g., Cooper v. F.A.A., No. C 07-1383 VRW, 2008 WL 8648952, at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
22, 2008), rev’d, 622 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2010).
208. F.A.A. v. Cooper, 131 S. Ct. 3025 (2011); see Kardon, supra note 69, at 766–67.
209. Complaint, supra note 9.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Doe v. F.B.I., 936 F.2d 1346, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
212. See Kardon, supra note 69, at 741–43.
213. See id.
214. Id. (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 385 n.9 (1966)).
215. See 120 CONG. REC. 12646 (May 1, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in SOURCE
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Court has recognized fundamental rights to privacy in numerous
circumstances.216
In Shearson, the plaintiff specifically alleged
interference with her right to travel,217 a right that finds support in
numerous Supreme Court decisions.218
Ultimately, as Congress recognized in 1974, a specific legislative
remedy is far superior to these mechanisms.219 Congress has the ability
to consider diverse national interests in determining what privacy
restrictions to place upon federal agencies.220 Leaving the remedies up
to state tort regimes could lead to great inconsistency. Because the right
to privacy is implied only through certain parts of the Constitution,
relying on the Constitution to protect individual privacy of its own force
is also problematic.221
F. The Balance Between Government Power and Individual Rights
The history of the Privacy Act shows that legislators intended to limit
the power of government in specific ways in order to secure important
individual rights.222 By limiting the ways that the government can
collect, maintain, and use personal information, the Privacy Act creates
a tension between an individual’s right to privacy and the government’s
interests in national security and law enforcement.223 Congress did not
impose these limits lightly; the Act’s drafters considered privacy rights
to be fundamental and rooted in the Constitution.224 The Supreme Court
has also endorsed the concept of privacy rights arising out of
Constitutional principles, whether through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection of liberty,225 through the First Amendment’s broad protection
of speech and assembly,226 or through the history and tradition of our
country.227 Given the importance of such rights, courts have every
reason to examine closely any government agency’s attempt to escape
BOOK, supra note 16, at 3–5; H.R. Rep. 93-1416, at 9, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at
302.
216. See 120 CONG. REC. 12646 (May 1, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 16, at 4.
217. Complaint, supra note 9, at ¶ 21.
218. See Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 282 n.7 (1974).
219. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 4–10, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 297–303.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 10, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 303.
222. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 1, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 154.
223. Hong, supra note 62, at 83–84.
224. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 9–10, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 302–03.
225. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973), modified on other grounds by Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
226. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–84 (1965).
227. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977).
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liability for its misuse of private information.
The increased consolidation of government information gathering
indicates that the Privacy Act, in its current form, will not suffice to
protect individual rights as Congress originally intended.228 As a part of
ensuring national security after the attacks on 9/11, Congress created
DHS and provided for a series of “fusion centers” that consolidate
intelligence and law enforcement data.229 These fusion centers allow for
cooperation among national intelligence agencies and local law
enforcement.230 As a side effect, however, these agencies have applied
anti-terrorism techniques to domestic law enforcement and created
massive databases of shared information, which may often include
incorrect or investigative information.231 Maintaining these centralized
databases without mechanisms to ensure the accuracy of records will
lead to the deprivations of due process that Congress sought to avoid
when it enacted the Privacy Act.232 These may be the “blacklists” that
Congress once feared, which can label a citizen a threat without bringing
criminal charges or providing him an opportunity to prove innocence.233
V. CONCLUSION
In today’s era of staggering technological development, Congress and
the courts must each play a role in protecting citizens from the harms
our nation feared during the passage of the Privacy Act. Courts should
safeguard the Privacy Act’s enforcement scheme by refusing to
recognize a total exemption for law enforcement agencies. Providing
for private enforcement of the Act’s substantive obligations is an
important part of the statutory scheme Congress designed. Individuals
have the strongest incentive to ensure the accuracy and confidentiality of
their own records, so allowing private judicial enforcement is an
effective way to ensure government compliance.234 Since limits on
damages have already reduced the effectiveness of private enforcement,
maintaining at least basic liability for injunctive relief is essential to the
continued utility of the Privacy Act.
Ultimately, however, the legislature must act to provide broader
protection of privacy rights. Under the current systems, there are too
228. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1442–43 (2011).
229. Id. at 1442–45.
230. Id. at 1448–54.
231. Id. at 1460–61.
232. See S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 16, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 169. For a
discussion including recent examples, see Crary, supra note 1.
233. See Ervin, supra note 20, at 19.
234. See Hong, supra note 62, at 109–11.
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many obstacles preventing a plaintiff from obtaining relief—not only in
damages, but also in injunctive relief to correct noncompliance. After
Julia Shearson was detained at the U.S. border without any explanation,
she only wanted to understand what happened and to correct the
government’s records about her. As it stands today, the Act seems to
appeal only to those who, like Ms. Shearson, are willing to fight a
lengthy legal battle simply to access or amend a government record. In
some ways, the creation of the centralized DHS has realized the fears
that Congress had in 1974, and cases like Shearson confirm the risk that
inaccurate records may deprive someone of basic guarantees of due
process.
There are a number of possible solutions. Congress could expand the
damages available and narrow the scope of the law enforcement
exemption.235 This would allow plaintiffs to enforce certain rights
effectively, though it would still leave many records inaccessible.
Alternatively, plaintiffs might seek other routes to vindicate privacy
rights under state law or perhaps under Constitutional theories, though
there are a number of problems with these approaches.236
The best strategy may be for Congress to create a stronger,
centralized administrative system, like the Privacy Protection
Commission that the original Senate proposal contemplated.237 The
report from the Committee on Government Operations called for “an
independent body of experts charged with protecting individual privacy
as a value in government and society.”238 This administrative system
would have several advantages, including: (1) complaints could be
handled rapidly, (2) the amount of legal fees from litigation could be
greatly reduced, (3) plaintiffs would have greater access to equitable
relief, (4) the availability of damages could be kept to a minimum, (5)
access to sensitive records would be limited to commissioners. An
organization like the Privacy Commission would give Congress greater
oversight of government agencies and reveal areas of concern. It would
allow Congress to restore the original vision of the Privacy Act and
renew its vitality in protecting citizens from the perils of unchecked
government data collection.

235. See id.
236. See Kardon, supra note 69, at 741–45.
237. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 23–27, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 176–80.
238. Id. at 23, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 176. The Privacy Commission would
have been empowered to monitor federal databases, investigate violations of the Act, and develop
recommendations for improvements. Id. at 23–24, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 16, at 176–
77.
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